How President Trump used modal verbs in his Syrian air strikes speech

A list of modal verb usage in President Trump's recent speech on the Syrian air strikes. "American" subjects are highlighted.

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Modal (auxiliary) verbs (can, could, should, would, must, will, etc.) are an interesting subset of American language, as they are used to indicate "intention" (the way things "ought to" be or "should" be, or an evaluation of what "can" happen). Different modals have different degrees of "modal force."

Here, you'll see that the modal "can" is the most commonly used, often referring to non-American subjects (e.g., "nations of the world" or "our friends"). In the three instances "can" is used in relation to Americans, two are negations ("No amount of American blood..." and "we cannot..."). In the last instance, "can" is used to express a hope, rather than an intention.

By contrast, the other "can" modals are used effectively as threats and evaluations: "The nations of the world can be judged by the friends they keep" or "Increased engagement [...] can ensure that Iran does not profit..."

This distinction is important because it uses our allies and vague "international norms" to express how the world "can" be. Even though the U.S. is certainly an instigator, the modal verb usage implies that we are trying to distance ourselves from taking ownership of these air strikes. We frame this use of force as unavoidable, because of actions taken by other states. The singular use of "would" and "must" in relation to Russia reinforces this further, especially given that they are used so closely together (Russia was supposed to do something, and then they didn't, so they now must do something else).

To make a long story short, we express the necessity of use of force here by saying what we (the US) "cannot" do, and implying what "can" (implicitly "should") happen as a result.

This speech obviously deviates from President Trump's typical language use, but it goes to show the significance of "use of force": even rebels fall in line when they have to justify violence.

(Hoping to do some analysis of news around this air strike tonight as well!)

Interview with Cap Times

This past week, I interviewed with Capital Times in Madison to talk about a recent co-authored study about Russian propaganda in U.S. news media.

I'm glad that the writer, Lisa Speckhard, did a great job capturing my greatest concern with Russian influence and disinformation. We know that the Russians are not going to stop trying to infiltrate U.S. public discourse. They haven't stopped since WWII, and I doubt they ever will.

What we can do is ask ourselves (1) where are they likely to make their way into American political discourse and (2) what can we do [on our end] to stop it.

Journalists are in a special space, as gatekeepers of information, to both prevent and perpetuate Russian propaganda from amplifying. As we learned through this study, this gate is not impervious... especially now that there are so many gates.

In order to keep our public discourse "pure" (that is, not unknowingly manipulated by foreign influences), we need to be self-reflexive, vigilant, and careful. I am continually reminded of this when news organizations reach out to members of our team asking about various articles that have included IRA-linked tweets. We need more news organizations like this and like Slate, who continue to be critical of their journalistic routines. 

New UW Study on Russian Twitter Trolls in U.S. Media

This past week, my research team published a study on news media's use of tweets written by Russia's Internet Research Agency (a copy of the study can be found here).

We also wrote a parallel article with Columbia Journalism Review.

Importantly, we show that Russian tweets conveying stereotypical partisan beliefs were picked up by a variety of mainstream and partisan news outlets. We are particularly critical of news stories that use "strings of tweet" to represent the vox populi (voice of the people). Unlike the more traditional "man on the street" interviews, tweets used in news stories (particularly online ones) are difficult to verify.

However, as shown by the (admittedly shallow) penetration of IRA tweets, it is still important for journalists to verify these Twitter users to the best of their ability. Journalists can do so by corresponding outside of the tweet-o-sphere (e.g., email), trying to look up the user's name on a search engine, or by looking at that user's past social media history.

Digital, partisan news outlets were particularly susceptible to embedded these IRA tweets. Liberal and conservative organizations both used tweets to convey cheap talk (discourse that supports their position or criticizes their opponents'). If the goal of Russian disinformation in the United States was to increase doubt in the news media system and increase polarization in the civil sphere, the amplification of these messages through partisan outlets represent some measure of success.

Why does this matter? Aside from natural concerns about deceptive foreign practices to our public sphere, the appearance of these messages across a broad range of news organizations  (bost partisan and traditional, liberal and conservative) shows how little tweets were checked. It highlights a greater problem: our willingness to promote partisan messages to prove a political point, even if they have little to no journalistic value and are not verified.